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Abstract- This paper examines the factors that affect performance, expense ratios and flows of Greek equity mutual funds 
during 2002-2005 and provides possible explanations for the rare phenomenon of a stagnated mutual fund market in the 
midst of growing capital markets in Greece and elsewhere. Results demonstrate strong economies of scale for expenses, a 
negative relationship between performance and expense ratio, funds flow reduction (increase) with increases in expenses 
(fund age and fund family), and a significant unexplained portion of funds flows. Also discovered is the inadequate 
competition due to large load fees and expense ratios of two to three times greater than those in other developed markets and 
a tradeoff between expense ratio and performance of 1.45 instead of 1 which has been observed in the literature. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fund expenses have great importance in the determination 
of mutual fund investors‟ returns but also in shaping the 
future of the fund industry. The increased competition in 
fund management in the last two decades has added 
pressure for continuous cost reductions. The innovations of 
no-load funds and ETFs were the result of an effort 
towards reducing fund fees and making fund industry more 
competitive in attracting funds relative to holding stocks or 
other bank products. Over the years, competition among 
mutual funds has reduced expense ratios significantly. Yet, 
this evolution is not the same across the continent since the 
development of capital markets is not entirely universal 
nor at the same level. For example, mutual fund expenses 
are greater in Europe than in the U.S. because European 
mutual funds encompass a greater number of charges than 
their U.S. counterparts. The cost advantage of US funds is 
the result of the large size and maturity of the US market, 
the effective supervision by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the strong trading activity of 
investors and the work of major and reliable auditing and 
evaluating companies, like Standard and Poor‟s, Lipper, 
and Morningstar.In contrast to the developed US and 
European markets, the Greek mutual fund industry has less 
than two decades of existence. Because the fund industry 
is bank-dominated, there is lack of independent fund 
managers which in turn affects the level of competition 
among them and the costs imposed on investors. Lack of 
sufficient competition in a market that shares the same 
currency with major European countries with highly 
developed mutual fund markets may have important 
consequences to its well-being and its future development. 
For this reason, it is of great importance to study the 
relationship between performance, risk, expenses and fund 
flows in this market and whether these relationships differ 
from those documented in the literature on developed fund 
management markets. At a time of free capital movement 
and access of investors to investment products across the 
globe with minimum costs, it is questionable whether new 
mutual fund markets can flourish on domestic terms only. 
This paper aims to identify the linkage between expenses, 
flows, and returns in the Greek equity mutual fund market 
in the period 2002-2005. The case of the Greek mutual 
fund market, where an initial rapid growth was followed 
by a serious decline and stagnation afterwards, presents an 
interesting case to study and extract useful 
recommendations for other young and developing mutual 
fund markets. When it comes to expenses related to mutual 
funds operations, there are two basic categories. The first 
one refers to the sales and redemption fees paid directly by 
investors when they first enter a mutual fund and when 
they depart from the fund, respectively. These fees reflect 
a pecuniary reduction in the net asset value of the shares 
they acquire or redeem. The second type of costs (paid 
indirectly) refers to the operating and administrative 
expenses which reduce the net value of the fund‟s portfolio 
and correspondingly, the value of an investor‟s 
holdings.Besides performance, expenses are the primary 
element of the degree of competition among mutual fund 
firms. The sales and redemption fees operate as a 
mechanism of attracting investors and preventing them 
from leaving. At the extreme, mutual fund firms reduce or 
even abolish sale and redemption loads on their products. 
Vanguard, which mainly charges investors no entrance or 
exit loads, is the dominant example of the strong 
competition among firms which, to one extreme, leads to 
International Journal of Management Excellence 
Volume 3 No.1 April 2014 
 
©
TechMind Research, Canada          293 | P a g e  
the elimination of sale charges. Kuhle and Pope (2000) 
find that the no-load funds have a performance advantage 
in the five-year period, although this advantage is vanished 
in the ten-year period. The size of costs, both the direct 
sales loads and the managerial and operating expenses, 
depends on the investment objective and the overall risk of 
the mutual fund. Funds with more risky investments have 
greater expense ratios in comparison to the income or bond 
funds. Further, funds that choose to invest internationally 
are more expensive relative to those investing 
domestically, due to the extended needs for research and 
the more insecure investing environment. Operating 
expenses compensate those participating in the investment 
process. Specifically, expenses reflect the portfolio 
managers‟ remuneration, trustee‟s fee, payments for tax 
liabilities, cost of fund‟s accounting requirements and 
auditing, cost of annual reports‟ issuance, custodian fees 
and transaction costs. All these expenses are reflected on 
the expense ratio of funds.From the perspective of fund 
managers, the administrative expenses may indicate their 
skills of stock selection and market timing to achieve 
above average performance. Managers claim that in an 
effort to realize superior returns for their clients, they 
generate additional expenses. Those who indeed bring off 
better performance in comparison to their competitors may 
increase their expenses charged as a compensation for their 
achievements. Other managers may prefer to maintain 
their charges in reasonably low levels to attract new assets 
under management, thus, increasing their compensation. 
As it is not certain whether managers upon achieving 
certain return will increase expenses or keep them at the 
same level, the relationship between performance and 
expenses cannot be defined a priori but it is subject to 
empirical investigation. This paper contributes to the open 
dialogue in the issues surrounding mutual fund variables, 
such as expenses, performance, fund flows and their 
interrelationships. We chose to examine these relationships 
using Greek mutual fund data because the Greek market 
has a number of unique characteristics not found in other 
developed markets: 1) it is a relatively young mutual fund 
market developed after financial de-regulation in 1989, 2) 
most mutual fund companies are bank subsidiaries and 
only a few and rather small are independent companies, 3) 
the managerial labor market is not functioning well since, 
in many cases, fund managers are not hired from the fund 
industry but from the ranks of the controlling banking 
institutions with limited fund management experience, 4) 
the market is under strict regulation by the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission which prevents managers from using 
all available tools to manage their funds efficiently, and 5) 
because of the strict regulation, product innovation has 
been slow and limited. The above market characteristics 
are likely to increase the operating costs of the Greek 
mutual fund market and make it less competitive, a 
situation that will affect expenses, performance, and fund 
flows. For this reason it is important and interesting to 
study the relationships of these variables in the context of a 
small and over-regulated market and extract useful insights 
concerning the magnitude of additional expenses involved 
as well as their effect on market performance and 
managerial behavior. The results will be compared with 
those known in larger and more developed mutual fund 
markets to examine the strength of these relationships even 
in the case of a market with operating inefficiencies.Our 
overall results suggest that the average Greek equity 
mutual fund is less aggressive than the market portfolio in 
the bull market period that we have examined and fund 
managers are not able to add value, as evidenced by their 
lack of selection ability. Expense ratios are blamed for a 
negative impact on risk-adjusted returns, a relationship 
found in other developed markets as well. However, while 
the increase of expenses by one unit results in a reduction 
of the return by one unit in developed and well-functioning 
markets, a one unit increase in expenses in the Greek 
market results in a reduction of the return by 1.45 units. 
This evidence suggests serious inefficiencies in the market. 
Similar to the literature, we found large economies of scale 
for expenses, a positive relationship between expenses and 
sales charges, expense reduction with increased 
performance, decrease in funds flows with increased 
expenses, increase in funds flows with fund age and fund 
family assets and a significant portion of funds flows 
unexplained.The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2 we survey the existing literature 
concerning the relationship between expenses and 
performance along with the factors that affect the 
magnitude of total costs and the money flows in mutual 
funds. In Section 3 we briefly describe the state of 
development of the Greek mutual fund sector since 1989. 
In Section 4 we describe the variables, the methodology 
and the regression models used in explaining returns, 
expenses and money flows in the Greek equity mutual 
funds. Section 5 describes the data used in this study. The 
empirical findings are presented in Section 6 and the 
summary and conclusions are discussed in the last Section 
7. 
2. LITERATURE  
The issue of mutual fund expenses has attracted extensive 
interest in the literature. A number of researchers explore 
the factors that affect the size of total costs which in turn 
reduce the net value of investors‟ holdings. Also, great 
attention has been paid in the relationship between 
expenses and return as well as the connection between 
funds‟ performance and the money flows to the managed 
portfolios. Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993), using a variety 
of single and multiple factor models in estimating the risk-
adjusted return, demonstrate that bond funds achieve 
inferior performance in comparison to their underlying 
benchmarks. The authors attribute this underperformance 
to the effect of expenses. Specifically, they estimate an 
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inverse one-to-one relationship between expenses and 
return. This finding implies that an increment of expenses 
by one unit results in a reduction of return by one unit too. 
Malkiel (1995) had also confirmed the negative association 
between performance and expenses for US mutual funds. 
Carhart (1997) reconfirmed the inverse relationship 
between returns and expenses and the persistence of 
performance when expenses are maintained in constant 
levels. For the European market, Otten and Bams (2002) 
also found a negative relationship between performance 
and expenses.Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) provide 
evidence that the magnitude of assets is a major 
determinant of expenses. In particular, the authors argue 
that a mutual fund has the ability to reduce the expenses 
charged to investors as long as the assets under 
management grow. They also show that the managers 
prefer to enhance their compensations by the accumulation 
of new money keeping constant the percentages of their 
fees. In another study, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) 
performed a comprehensive analysis of the factors that 
affect the size of expenses of equity and bond funds for the 
years 1992 and 1993. They found that the expense ratio of 
equity funds is influenced by the length of assets, age, 
turnover, cash holdings and the 12b-1 fees. The authors 
conclude that the large funds with long history, low 
turnover and without entrance charges, redemption and 
12b-1 fees encumber investors with the lowest expense 
ratios. Using a sample of 2.610 funds with various 
investment objectives, Latzko (1999) estimates the 
expenses‟ elasticity relative to assets to be less than unity. 
The estimated size of expenses‟ elasticity reflects the 
existence of strong economies of scale, which could result 
in substantial reduction of total expenses. The existence of 
economies of scale in large funds was also studied by 
Malhotra and McLeod (2000). By studying the 
components of expenses of closed-end funds they 
confirmed that administrative experience and efficiency 
exhibited by aged funds result in lower expenses. 
Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) examine the Finnish 
mutual funds market. Among other things, they find that 
foreign funds offered in the Finnish market have lower 
expenses than similar funds on domestic assets. This 
difference is attributed to the lesser development of the 
Finnish market. Furthermore, they find higher expenses 
charged by older funds and funds operated by 
banks.Livingston and O‟Neal (1998) consider expenses as 
a more reliable and efficient criterion in evaluating and 
selecting mutual funds relative to return, since expenses 
are more consistent through time, while performance is 
not. The authors suggest that investors should prefer the 
funds, which present the lowest net present value of the 
anticipated future expenses. In the same line of reasoning, 
Bechmann and Rangvid (2004) develop a mechanism to 
evaluate Danish funds on the basis of their expenses. They 
perform a regression analysis applying dummy variables, 
which reflect the different rank categories based on cost 
levels. Their results reveal partial predictive power on the 
future performance in a time interval between 8 to 10 
years.Besides the literature on expenses and mutual fund 
performance presented above, a number of authors are 
concerned with money flows towards and from mutual 
funds. Warther (1995) finds a strong interactive 
relationship among funds‟ inflows and aggregate security 
returns. Specifically, he demonstrates that securities‟ 
returns are highly correlated with the concurrent 
unexpected cash flows into mutual funds, but they are not 
related to concurrent expected flows. He also finds 
evidence of a positive relationship between flows and 
subsequent returns and evidence of a negative relation 
between returns and subsequent flows.Goetzmann and 
Massa (1999) analyze the correlation between index funds 
and asset prices and found a strong contemporaneous 
relationship between fund inflows and S&P market 
returns. In the same context of investor‟s behavior, a 
significant money outflow from the funds occurs in a bear 
market. Going further, Zheng (1999) finds evidence that 
funds which receive more money perform much better in 
comparison to the funds that receive less. This implies a 
strategy of betting on the winners, however, the authors do 
not exploit it empirically.Edelen and Warner (2001), using 
high frequency data investigated the positive relationship 
between returns and flows, providing substantial support 
for such claim. They found a strong positive connection 
between fund flows and previous day‟s return, implying a 
day-by-day interaction between fund flows and 
performance. On the same argument, Wermers (2003) 
presented evidence for the substantial correlation between 
cash flows and funds‟ performance persistence. He infers 
that inflows are highest for the funds with the best lagged 
performance. Berk and Green (2004) argue that fund flows 
respond to funds‟ past performance even though this return 
is not persistent and the managers do not outperform 
passive benchmarks, on average. According to these 
authors, the flow-return relationship is consistent with high 
average levels of skills and significant heterogeneity across 
managers. This result is in disagreement with Elton, 
Gruber and Busse (2004). Their argument is that most of 
the variability of funds flows remains unexplained because 
a significant amount of flows is directed by financial 
advisors or brokers not on the basis of superior 
performance but on the basis of commissions they extract 
from the fund inflows. 
3. THE GREEK MUTUAL FUND MARKET 
The first two Greek mutual funds were established in the 
period 1972-73. The largely regulated and bank-dominated 
Greek financial system did not offer incentives for the 
market to take off at that time. As shown in Table 1, only 
when de-regulation in capital markets was introduced in 
1989, assets under management from €7.7 million at that 
time grew to a maximum of €34.5 billion in 1999, its peak 
level. Since then, assets under management remained near 
or below €30 billion but in the last two years declined 
significantly to a level of about 21 billion euros at the end 
of 2006. This decline in assets under management persists 
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despite the promotional effort by banking institutions to 
direct a portion of deposits to mutual funds by offering 
higher interest rates to remaining deposits as incentives.A 
similar rapid increase has been seen in the number of 
available mutual funds reaching 269 by 2001 but 
subsequently reduced to 247 by the end of 2006. Also, the 
number of mutual fund management companies grew to 28 
in 2002 and reduced afterwards to 25 by the end of 2006. 
Of the 25 mutual funds companies, 18 are bank 
subsidiaries, 5 are subsidiaries of insurance companies, 
one is independent, and one is the fund management 
company of the largest Greek pension fund. The reduction 
in the number of mutual funds and the fund management 
companies was the result of mainly bank consolidation that 
led in turn to consolidation of their mutual fund 
management companies. The evolution in the Greek 
mutual fund market is not typical of other developed 
mutual fund markets. US and European mutual fund 
markets experienced a constant and dynamic growth 
offering new products and covering many sectors and 
different geographic regions. Such are the examples of the 
dynamic development of ETFs, the introduction of sector 
mutual funds investing globally, and the growth of country 
index funds. These developments were necessitated by the 
need to reduce costs, provide trading opportunities to 
mutual funds to compete with actively traded equities and 
commodities, and offer international diversification 
choices. All these improvements in the developed mutual 
fund markets were possible with the support of the 
regulators.In contrast to these developments in the fund 
management industry, the Greek mutual fund market did 
not make the needed changes to capitalize on its early 
phenomenal success. The stock market level that peaked in 
1999 had helped direct significant amounts of capital to 
equity funds, a portion of which was lost due to the 
subsequent stock market decline. This may be blamed as 
one reason for the absence of new inflows of money 
despite the significant stock market upturn in the 2002-05 
period. However, other reasons are also credited for the 
current stagnation in the market: lack of innovation in 
introducing new products, long delays in deciding the legal 
framework of ETFs,and the persistent large expenses 
charged on investors. Indeed, when compared with mutual 
funds in other countries, Greek mutual funds charge two or 
even three times more.The Greek mutual fund market is 
supervised by the Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
(HCMC). Law 1969/1991 (amended by Law 3283/2004) 
gives HCMC absolute power to grant and revoke operating 
licenses to mutual funds and mutual fund management 
companies, to fine mutual fund companies for unlawful 
practices or omissions, and to do everything necessary to 
protect the interests of investors and the well-functioning 
of the capital markets. Also, the HCMC is responsible to 
act on all contemporary issues concerning capital markets 
and its decisions become part of legislation concerning, 
among other things, the operations of the mutual fund 
market. Most of the legislation that affects the decisions of 
mutual fund managers relates to the maximum and 
minimum investment limits in individual securities, 
individual companies, and type of securities allowed. 
Investment limitations are imposed on fund managers in an 
effort to protect investors from investment exploitation, 
that is, from lack of adequate diversification, over-
exposure on one issuer, excessive risk taking beyond that 
expected of the type of mutual fund. The use of derivatives 
is also regulated on the type of the instrument used and the 
magnitude of position taken relative to assets under 
management. To avoid the taking of speculative positions, 
derivatives are allowed mostly for hedging and there is a 
strict prohibition for undertaking positions in commodities. 
Although designed to protect the interests of investors, the 
above strict regulations may interfere with the efficient 
management of mutual funds. For example, in the case of 
the National Bank of Greece, the larger traded company in 
the Athens Stock Exchange, the rule for maximum holding 
of 10% of its shares prevents managers from following the 
stock market index in which this issue is represented with 
much more than 10%. Also, the inability of establishing 
effective portfolio hedging becomes a disadvantage for 
Greek mutual funds relative to similar mutual funds 
established elsewhere and without hedging restrictions. As 
expected, these limitations are likely to increase the 
regulatory costs making the industry more expensive and 
less efficient. 
4. VARIABLES, MODELS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Variables  
In this section, we describe the variables and the 
methodology used in our analysis of the Greek equity 
mutual funds. The first variable concerns the gross annual 
performance of funds computed as the return between two 
subsequent years of net asset prices multiplied to expense 
ratios. The calculation of net asset price is net of expenses 
and of purchase and redemption fees. Furthermore, we 
assume that fund dividends (if any) are re-invested on the 
ex-dividend day. The second variable used in our analysis 
is the annual percentage expense ratio of funds. We 
calculate expense ratio by dividing total indirect expenses 
by the fund‟s net assets. Expense ratio reflects all 
management and trustee fees, expenditures for tax 
payments, accounting monitoring, auditing, attendance and 
securities transactions, but it does not include entrance and 
exit fees paid directly by investors. We note that in some 
cases, Greek mutual fund families use to incorporate costs 
related to exchange rate differences and previous year‟s 
losses in their expense account. In our estimation of 
expense ratio we do not take into account these amounts 
following, first, the related Decision by the HCMC (No 25, 
11 November 2004) and, secondly, the literature, which 
does not consider exchange differences and capital losses 
as costs which should be embodied in the expense ratio. 
Another variable in our analysis is the Athens Stock 
Exchange General Index used as the market portfolio in 
our analysis. Daily prices of the index were collected to 
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compute index returns. In addition to the above variables, 
we calculate the proportions of purchase and redemption 
costs. Specifically, we compute the purchase fee as the 
difference between the share‟s purchase price and the net 
asset price divided by the net asset price of the fund‟s 
share at the end of the year. We estimate the redemption 
fee in a similar manner. We also record the assets under 
management for each fund at the end of the year as another 
variable. We note that when a merger between two or more 
funds occurs, we consider the total assets of the resulted 
fund. In addition, we report the net money flows of mutual 
funds. When a merger occurs between two funds, the asset 
increase is not accounted as a money flow, this way 
avoiding the upward bias in our estimations. As the last 
variable we calculate the age of the Greek equity funds. 
Age is the number of years from the initiation of a fund.      
4.2 Risk-Adjusted Performance 
To investigate the skill of managers to achieve superior 
returns we use the risk-adjusted return in Jensen‟s model: 
Ri - Rf  = αi + βi(Rm- Rf) + εi             
   (1) 
Ri denotes the weekly return of mutual fund i including all 
expenses. Rm represents the return of the market portfolio 
and Rf is the corresponding risk-free rate as reflected in the 
Euribor rate. The coefficient αi (Jensen‟s alpha) reflects the 
risk-adjusted performance of fund i and measures the 
selection skill of fund managers to provide investors with 
returns irrespective of the average market return. The 
coefficient βi stands for the systematic risk of fund i and 
evaluates the degree of fund‟s sensitivity to the movements 
of the benchmark. εi represents the residuals of regression 
equation (1). This regression, first, is estimated with 
weekly returns for each year separately and then it is run 
using monthly returns for the entire four-year period.  
4.3 Explaining Performance 
To investigate the factors which influence the 
determination of funds‟ performance, we run the following 
cross-sectional model in each year in the period 2002-05: 
R = a0 + a1(ExpRatio) + a2(PurFee) + a3(RedFee) + 
a4(LnAge) + a5(Dummy) + u  (2) 
where, R is the dependent variable computed as the yearly 
mean of the weekly percentage returns of equity funds. 
The control variables are the asset-weighted annual 
expense ratio (ExpRatio), the purchase (PurFee) and 
redemption (RedFee) fees, the natural logarithm of funds‟ 
age (LnAge) and a dummy variable (Dummy), which takes 
the value 1 if the fund is owned and managed by a bank 
and the value of zero, otherwise. The natural logarithm of 
age is used due to the non-linear relation between 
performance and age. All along, the fund management 
industry argues that expenses are incurred to enhance the 
ability of managers to achieve superior returns. If this 
argument was true, the coefficient a1 should be positive 
and statistically significant. However, the bulk of the 
literature finds negative relationship between returns and 
expenses suggesting that fund managers incur costs at the 
expense of performance. This is compatible with a 
negative a1 coefficient. In a similar reasoning, we expect 
the estimations for a2 and a3 to be negative as well. The 
age of a fund is found to be positively correlated with the 
fund‟s performance. Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) find 
that the oldest funds are better performers in comparison to 
their younger peers implying a positive a4 estimate. Age 
reflects the accumulated experience in funds, which may 
result in better stock picking and suitable time selections. 
Otten and Bams (2002) find an opposite relationship for 
Germany and the UK mutual fund markets suggesting that 
the younger funds perform better suggesting a negative 
estimate for a4. While the authors do not offer an 
explanation for such finding, in a more competitive 
environment for younger funds to penetrate the market, 
they may institute smaller expenses, and thus a better 
performance. In a less competitive environment this may 
not be necessary. Finally, the bank origin of a fund has 
been assumed to result in better returns in comparison to 
the non-bank mutual funds. This may be due to better 
information held by banks about the true quality of listed 
firms. Yet, this may not be universal. Bank originated 
funds may be subject to more supervision by the bank or 
may lack independence in selecting securities if fund 
managers are required to support the bank‟s policies 
regarding bank‟s clients IPO‟s, seasoned equity issues, etc. 
On the contrary, non-affiliated funds do not face such 
restrictions in their investment decisions, are more flexible 
and active selectors thus likely to achieve better returns. 
The findings of Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) support 
this assumption of better performance by non-bank funds 
implying a negative sign for a5. One thing ought to be 
mentioned here is that the literature suggests various other 
factors for the determination of funds‟ returns like the 
investing objective, the nature of funds as if they are ought 
to be purchased only by institutional or both by 
institutional and retail investors. We omit to include such 
variables in our regression since we checked for the 
statistical efficiency of these variables to the explanatory 
power of the model and we confirmed their limited 
contribution. We also checked for the significance of 
decomposing the funds in domestic, foreign and 
international classes, finding again not any statistical 
importance. Similar statistical insignificance of these 
variables is also found in models explaining fund expenses 
and flows presented in the sections that follow. 
4.4 Explaining Expenses 
Having introduced the regression approach to the 
determination of equity funds‟ performance, we now turn 
to define the expense ratio‟s explanatory components in 
the following cross-sectional model: 
ExpRatio = a0 + a1(LnAsset) + a2(Alpha) + a3(Beta) + 
a4(PurFee) + a5(RedFee) + ε         (3) 
where, ExpRatio is the annual asset-weighed expense ratio 
as the dependent variable. The first independent factor is 
the natural logarithm of funds‟ assets (LnAssets). 
According to Malhotra and McLeod (1997, 2000), Latzko 
(1999), and Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004), the size of 
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assets has a negative impact on fund expenses. Due to the 
attained economies of scale, funds with high level of 
managed assets are associated with lower expense ratios. 
As a result, we expect a negative and statistical significant 
coefficient for assets. With respect to the risk-adjusted 
performance captured in alpha, there is evidence of a 
negative influence on the expense ratio. Gruber (1996) and 
Latzko (1999) claim that managers who achieve superior 
returns, choose to increase the fees they charge their 
investors. For the remainder of the independent variables 
we expect positive coefficients. Regarding systematic risk 
(beta), it has been observed that funds that invest in more 
risky securities are associated with higher management 
fees than less risky counterparts. Similarly, entry (PurFee) 
and exit (RedFee) fees tend to have a positive influence on 
the expenses.  Bechmann and Rangvid (2004) showed that 
the relationship between expenses and sales charges is 
positive. 
4.5 Explaining Fund Flows 
The last issue being investigated in this paper deals with 
the determination of money flows. That is, we seek to 
explore the nature and the magnitude of the factors that 
explain the variability of money inflows and outflows from 
equity funds. We estimate the following cross-sectional 
regression in equation (4):  
LnFlows = a0 + a1(ExpRatio) + a2(LnAge) + a3(Alpha) + 
a4(LnFamily) + ε      (4) 
In this regression, the dependent variable LnFlows is the 
natural logarithm of funds‟ flows defined as the absolute 
difference between the total inflows and outflows during 
the entire year. This difference is estimated at the end of 
each year. We note that we use the absolute value of the 
estimated difference in order to calculate the natural 
logarithm of flows efficiently for each fund in the sample. 
We chose four individual variables as the control factors of 
funds‟ flows. Expense ratio is the first independent 
variable and we expect a negative relationship between 
flows and expenses. This follows a natural process by 
rational investors who, ceteris paribus, withdraw their 
assets from a costly fund and transfer them into a less 
costly fund. As a result, we expect a negative coefficient 
for a1. We expect the age of funds to have a positive 
influence on the movement of fund flows, that is, we 
expect a positive value for a2. Age signals the experts‟ 
accumulated experience in fund management which 
probably results in greater inflows, since rational investors 
may assume that the oldest funds are more experienced 
and could achieve better performance. Next, we consider 
the relationship between fund flows and fund performance 
(Alpha). As mentioned earlier, the winning funds (funds 
with superior performance), usually attract more money in 
comparison to the funds with poor return records. 
Accordingly, we expect a positive estimation for the 
coefficient of risk-adjusted return, a3. The last factor we 
consider is the fund‟s family assets and its influence on the 
money flow into the equity mutual funds of the family. 
Families with large assets could impact positively on 
investors‟ sentiment about their potentiality to deliver 
above average returns, motivating the placement of new 
assets into large families‟ mutual funds. Also in a bank-
dominated mutual fund market, bank customers are being 
advised to invest in the bank‟s family mutual funds thus 
establishing a direct and positive influence of the funds 
family to the funds flows. Therefore, we expect a positive 
estimation for the coefficient of family‟s size, a4.  
5. RESEARCH DATA  
Our sample includes all the various types of Greek equity 
funds for the time period between 2002 and 2005. At first, 
we consider the weekly returns of funds calculated on 
gross asset value terms. The website of Greek Institutional 
Investors Association provides us with the weekly net 
asset prices of funds. These data include also the initial 
trading date, which is used in the computation of funds‟ 
age.We estimate model (1) using weekly data to eliminate 
the autocorrelation bias usually observed in daily data. We 
estimate expense ratios in any individual year from 
information on expenses from funds‟ annual reports. 
Annual reports were collected manually in hard copies 
from the fund management firms. The size of assets of 
each fund as well as its family along with the funds flows 
were collected from the electronic database of the Greek 
Institutional Investors Association. Percentage front-end 
and back-end fees were calculated using the purchase and 
redemption share‟s values of funds at the end of the year 
found in the Greek economic newspaper “Naftemporiki.” 
In forming our sample we also looked into the survivorship 
bias problem, common in this kind of studies. Survivorship 
bias issue reflects the overestimation of average returns 
caused by the absence of non-existing funds. This paper 
tries to deduct this overestimation problem by including 
data for funds that do not currently exist. The basic 
requirement for the participation of a ceased fund in the 
sample is to present trading records for at least one full 
year. The Greek mutual funds that disappeared were not 
because of their failures but only because of merging with 
other funds. Mutual fund failure is a non-event because 
mutual fund regulation is very strict and no fund was left 
to fail. Also, most of the funds belong to thriving Greek 
banks which themselves could not allow them to fail. As a 
result, we do not expect to have included the survivorship 
bias in our data.  
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This section presents the empirical results of the study. 
First, we record the statistic characteristics of equity funds 
in our sample and, then, we present the main findings 
according to our proposed regression models concerning 
funds‟ performance, expenses and flows. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of Greek equity 
funds by year during 2002-05. Presented variables are the 
gross annual percentage return, the expense ratio, the 
purchase and redemption fees, the size of assets, the net 
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funds flows and the age of funds. For these variables 
estimations are given for the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values and the median. The 
median values are reported in parallel to the mean values 
because they are less sensitive to extreme scores than the 
mean for highly skewed distributions.Within the four-year 
period, the mean (median) annual return fluctuates from  -
26.73% (-27.29%) to 25.96% (27.33%). The minimum 
return occurs in 2002 and the maximum in 2005. This 
fluctuation reflects the general stock market climate in 
Greece during the period. The Greek stock exchange 
experienced great losses in 2002 followed by a bull market 
period. The mean and median values are essentially 
equivalent, indicating a symmetric return distribution. The 
standard deviation of annual returns ranges from 8.76% in 
2002 to 11.35% in 2003. Interestingly, the highest ex-post 
standard deviation is not associated with the highest ex-
post return. Regarding expense ratios, we find that the 
sample‟s mean expense ratio fluctuates from 3.41% to 
4.95%. The median values are basically close to the mean 
for all years, except for 2004. For that year the difference 
between mean and median expense ratios amounts to 
approximately 63 basis points. Interestingly enough, the 
lowest average expense ratios are associated with higher 
returns. Specifically, 2003 and 2005 present both the 
highest performance and the lowest expense records. This 
finding is in line to evidence from Gruber (1996), among 
others, who concludes that funds with the best 
performance appear to have the lowest expense ratios. 
Furthermore, in comparison to expense ratios in other 
developed capital markets, Greek mutual fund expense 
ratios are more than twice as large. According to evidence 
by Khorama, Servaes and Tufano (2006), the mean value 
of expense ratios for a sample of 21.543 equity funds in 
developed countries in 2002 is 1.87%. The authors argue 
that differences in fund fees are due to national differences 
in regulation, competition, national economies of scale, 
industry experience and buyer characteristics. Regarding 
sales charges, we find that investors suffer serious 
reductions from their investment value due to the large 
purchase and redemption fees they face. The highest 
average (median) purchase fee reaches 2.93% (3.02%) for 
2003, while the highest average (median) redemption fee is 
1.47% for 2005. We judge that these fees are extremely 
high thus discouraging investors from entering funds. In 
the four-year period, these fees remained large despite the 
fact that interest rates have decreased at very low levels as 
much as 2%. Indeed, with the price of money at these low 
levels investors would not be willing to pay a high price to 
enter the mutual funds. By keeping sales charges at these 
high levels seen in Table 2 which were imposed during the 
period of the stock market bull in late 1990‟s, it made 
investments in mutual funds inferior compared to existing 
risk free rates. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
Greek mutual fund industry remained rigid, kept the high 
charges imposed on investors, and ignored the drastic 
changes taking place in its investment environment. 
Considering the average size of assets, we observe that 
assets grew continuously from 2002 to 2005. In contrast, 
the average fund flow exhibit a descending drift, implying 
that the growth of total assets does not reflect necessarily 
the accession of new money in equity funds, but, it is 
rather a side-effect of the increase in stock prices. 
Interestingly, we note that there is a huge gap between the 
mean and median values of assets. Also, the standard 
deviation of assets is extremely high. This fact implies that 
assets‟ distribution is not symmetrically plotted and it is 
obviously positively skewed. Since we do not observe 
closures of mutual funds in Greece, fund age should 
increase over the years of our study. As expected, the 
maximum average age of 7.46 years occurs in year 2005. 
The basic inference from this figure is that the Greek 
market of equity funds is practically young in comparison 
to the developed US and European markets. As a result, 
the different level of maturity and competition among 
mutual funds that such maturity implies may influence 
some of our regression results to differ from what has been 
recorded in the literature in the US, UK and other 
European markets. The number of available funds in our 
sample does not change materially in the four years of the 
studying period and ranges from 116 in 2002 to 102 in 
2005. In these numbers included are three classes of equity 
funds: domestic, foreign and international equity funds. 
The reduction in the number of equity funds in 2005 is 
mainly due to the decision of the HCMC to abolish the 
class of international funds. This decision led to the merger 
of international funds with other domestic or foreign funds.    
6.2 Regression Results in Explaining Risk-Adjusted 
Performance 
The estimations of regression model (1) for risk-adjusted 
performance are presented in Table 3. Included in the table 
are the average value of Jensen‟s alpha, the mean beta 
coefficient for systematic risk and the average R-square for 
each year. Also presented is the number and the portion of 
statistically significant and non-significant positive as well 
as negative alphas. Lastly, the number of available funds in 
each year is also shown.The data calculations reveal that 
the average alpha is negative in all four years of our study 
and very close to zero in 2003 and 2005. These results 
suggest that the average fund performance is inferior to the 
performance of the market portfolio and the managerial 
ability to select the right assets to beat the market portfolio 
is absent. Examining the number of significant positive 
and negative alphas at all acceptable levels (1%, 5% and 
10%), we see that the percentage of positive alphas ranges 
from 0% in 2004 to 8.9% in 2003. In contrast, the 
significant negative alphas lie between 0% in 2005 to 
53.5% in 2004. Overall, negative alphas (significant and 
non-significant) outnumber positive alphas in all four 
years. The last column in Table 3 shows estimation results 
of regression (1) for the entire period using monthly 
returns. As expected, the results are mostly a close average 
of the individual estimates for each year. Jensen‟s alpha 
has a negative but close to zero value of -0.06. Still 
negative alphas outnumber positive alphas but only by a 
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small magnitude (47 versus 41). Although the results on 
monthly returns are less critical of the managerial selection 
ability, yet, the conclusion for lack of such ability is 
substantiated. Interestingly, this conclusion is drawn 
during a bull market period that begun in 2003. According 
to results in Table 3, the average beta estimate on monthly 
data is 0.69 suggesting that funds have pursued defensive 
investment policies which led to inferior performance 
relative to the market. Finally, according to Table 3 the 
average R-square values range from 0.55 in 2004 to 0.66 
in 2003. The values of R-square are judged to be 
adequately high reflecting the explanatory power of the 
estimated regressions.  
6.3 Regression Results in Explaining Performance 
In this section we present the results of regression model 
(2) to explain the determinants of funds‟ performance. 
Table 4 presents the model‟s estimations for expense ratio, 
purchase and redemption fees, age, and the dummy 
variable which accounts for the bank ownership of the 
fund. The table also reports the values of the R-square and 
F-statistic.According to the regression results, the constant 
coefficients are statistically significant in each of the four 
years. This suggests that there is a set of undetectable 
factors which affect the performance of the sample‟s funds 
during the studying period. These factors could be 
connected with the general micro- and macro-economic 
environment. Furthermore, the sign of the constant is 
negative for 2002 and positive for the remaining years. 
The negative constant for 2002 is reasonable since the 
performance of the Greek stock market was negative 
within that year. The negative sign of constant could also 
reflect the failure of managers to perform successful 
defensive strategies by picking defensive stocks. The 
positive sign of the constant for the remaining years is 
probably due to the rise of the Greek stock prices during 
this period. As expected, the estimations on the expense 
ratio are negative and highly significant for all years 
except 2002, reflecting the negative impact of expenses on 
the fund‟s return. This finding is in line with evidence in 
the literature in other developed fund markets. 
Specifically, the coefficients of funds‟ expense ratios range 
from -0.05 for 2002 to -2.47 for 2003. The average value 
of these coefficients is -1.45 implying that the expense 
ratio counts sizably for the reduction in returns in Greece 
relatively to other developed markets where the reduction 
in return is about one-for-one. The estimations of purchase 
and redemption fees are statistically significant in the first 
two years and insignificant in the remaining two. Further, 
the signs of estimations are not one-directional. 
Specifically, the purchase fee is significantly positive in 
2002 but negative in 2003 while the redemption fee is 
negative in 2002 and positive in 2003. These mixed results 
prevent us from providing a definite conclusion about the 
impact of purchase and redemption fees on performance. 
The estimations of the age coefficient for the first two 
years are negative but statistically insignificant. For 2004 
the age coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
and in 2005 the sign of the coefficient is negative with 
statistical significance at the 10% level. The mostly 
negative age coefficients is not in line to the findings by 
Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004), who claim that the oldest 
funds have performance advantages in comparison to their 
young counterparts. The inconclusive sign of the age 
coefficient suggests that fund age in a young mutual fund 
market may not be used as a reliable estimate for equity 
fund returns.Finally, the dummy variable about the bank‟s 
ownership of the fund is found to be positive in 2002 and 
negative for the subsequent years of study, yet, none were 
statistically significant. This result implies that the fund 
management by bank- controlled mutual funds does not 
provide any substantial additional returns in comparison to 
the non-bank affiliated funds.  Overall, the values of R-
square and F-statistic are sufficiently high, providing 
evidence for the strong explanatory power of the model. 
Specifically, the R-square values range from 0.16 in 2004 
to 0.59 in 2002 and, similarly, the F-statistic values range 
from 4.02 to 26.42 for the corresponding years. F-statistics 
are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  
6.4 Regression Results in Explaining Expenses 
Regression equation (3) estimates the factors that affect the 
determinants of expense ratio and the results are shown in 
Table 5. Estimation results are shown for the constant, the 
funds‟ assets, Jensen‟s alpha and beta coefficients, and 
purchase and redemption fees. Also presented are the 
values of R-square and F-statistics.The regression intercept 
is positive and statistically significant in every year. This 
means that investors in equity mutual funds face fixed 
costs when they maintain a mutual fund equity investment. 
This fixed cost does not relate to the independent variables 
of the model and potentially reflects the costs paid by 
mutual funds for capital market supervision, tax services, 
and trustee‟s compensations.According to the findings of 
Table 5, fund assets are negatively related to the expense 
ratio. The estimations of assets‟ variable are all negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. This negative 
correlation demonstrates the existence of strong economies 
of scale, an expected result as the literature has 
demonstrated the inverse impact of assets on expenses in 
developed capital markets.  Focusing on the risk-adjusted 
performance, we observe that the alpha‟s coefficients are 
positive in 2002 but negative for the subsequent years. 
However, alphas are statistically significant only for 2004 
and 2005 at the 10% level. The finding in the last two 
years offers weak evidence that as performance increases 
managers may reduce the fees they charge investors to 
attract new flows. This result is in line to early findings of 
such effect in the literature.Regarding the relationship 
between expense ratio and beta, we note that the 
coefficients on systematic risk are either positive or 
negative and statistically insignificant. This result suggests 
does there is no significant relationship between expense 
ratio and systematic risk, in contrast to the accepted belief 
that funds with higher risk charge higher expenses. It is 
likely that another variable in the regression, such as the 
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purchase or the redemption fees, plays the proxy for the 
systematic risk. The coefficients for the purchase fee are 
either positive or negative but statistically insignificant 
except in 2005. However, for the redemption fee, with the 
exception of 2002, the coefficients are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better. This 
evidence supports the conclusion that expense ratio is 
positively related to sales fees. The interpretation is that 
usually funds with the highest front-end and/or back-end 
fees encumber investors with the highest administrative 
and operating expenses too. The state of competition that 
permits fund managers to incur large expense ratios, also 
allows them to charge large entry and exit fees. We also 
note that the size of exit fee is large enough to discourage 
investors from departing funds. Finally, the value of F-
statistics are all statistically significant at the 1% level and 
the R-squares are sufficiently high (ranging from 0.22 to 
0.40) suggesting that model (3) explains sufficiently 
enough the determinants of Greek equity funds expense 
ratios. 
6.5 Regression Results in Explaining Fund Flows 
In this section we present the estimations of model (4) to 
explain fund flows. The estimations of regression (4) along 
with the R-square and F-statistics are shown in Table 6. 
The estimates for the constant are all positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that there is a 
significant portion of funds flows unrelated to the variables 
used in the regression. This is in line with the argument 
made by Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) who provided 
evidence of large unexplained variability in fund flows. In 
the case of the Greek funds, the large magnitude of the 
intercept may stand for the promotional programs pursued 
by banks to direct some of the deposits into mutual funds 
while the remaining deposits earn interest rates higher than 
the market interest rate. Also the personal influence of 
insurance and mutual fund salesmen and advisors who 
have own incentives to direct money to those mutual funds 
they represent irrespective of other objective fund 
characteristics. With respect to outflows, possible 
unrelated factors to our regression model include the 
investors‟ need for diversification, the investors‟ exodus 
from mutual funds after the market advance (2003-2005) 
who felt entrapped after the stock market fallout (1999-
2002), and the European directive that allows the easy 
distribution of mutual funds originated in one European 
country to be sold in another. As expected, we observe that 
the expense ratio has a negative influence on fund flows. 
All coefficients of expense ratio in Table 6 are negative 
and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The 
negative relationship between fund flows and expenses 
implies that investors redeem funds shares when expenses 
rise. Such behavior by the investors assumes that they are 
well-informed about the costs they incur and that they pick 
funds based, among other things, on their expenses. With 
respect to age, the results show a positive and statistically 
significant influence on fund flows. In particular, the 
coefficient for age‟s natural logarithm is positive and 
significant in all four years. This positive estimation 
implies investors‟ trend to allocate money in the oldest 
funds. This preference is not because of an expectation that 
they could achieve better performance as our evidence in 
Table 4 suggests that fund age does not significantly affect 
fund performance. Based on the combined evidence it 
seems that investors are injecting money in older mutual 
funds without taking into account their performance which 
is not at all superior to the market. Again, this is probably 
due to the monopolistic mutual fund environment with 
banks dominating the market with the older mutual funds 
to which they direct their customer funds. Also, banks‟ 
promotional strategies direct money into mutual funds 
irrespective of their performance through offering 
incentives in combination with other bank products. 
Further, we examine the relationship between fund flows 
and Jensen‟s alpha. Alpha coefficients are all positive and 
statistically significant in the case of 2003. This positive 
relationship between fund flows and performance of Greek 
equity funds is in line with the findings in the literature. 
Zheng (1999), Edelen and Warner (2001), and Wermers 
(2003), among other researchers, find evidence of money 
inflows into funds upon successful current or previous 
performance. Considering the impact of fund family on 
fund flows we observe a positive relationship between the 
two. The coefficients of family‟s assets are positive and 
statistically significant during the entire period. This result 
suggests that investors attach value to large fund families 
perhaps due to their experience and access to private 
information about stocks. Large fund families could take 
advantage of these components and achieve better returns. 
The fact that out of the thirty five mutual fund 
management companies, the five largest are bank-
controlled, it suggests that such a preference to fund 
families must exist. 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The literature has shown great interest in investigating the 
performance, expenses and the flows into and from mutual 
funds in the US, European and Asian markets. In Greece, 
there is a lack of evidence on the relationship between 
expenses, fund flows and performance. This paper fills the 
respective literature‟s gap and allows comparisons of the 
young Greek mutual fund market with developed ones. It 
also attempts to provide an explanation for the rare 
phenomenon of a stagnated mutual fund market in the 
midst of growing capital markets in Greece and elsewhere. 
At first, considering risk-adjusted performance we find 
evidence that the overall alpha is negative and close to 
zero in all four years. This inferior performance is below 
the line of evidence for other markets on fund managers‟ 
selection ability. Regarding the explanatory factors of 
performance, we demonstrate that risk-adjusted return is 
influenced negatively by expense ratio. The negative 
impact of expenses on returns is substantial and it is equal 
to 1.45 in average terms. Further, we find inconclusive 
evidence of the relationship between age and performance 
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and we suggested that fund age in a young mutual fund 
market may not be used as a reliable estimate for equity 
fund returns. In explaining the variability in the expense 
ratio, we find that the size of funds‟ assets contribute to the 
reduction of percentage levels of expenses. In accordance 
to literature‟s findings, we find large economies of scale. 
We also find that the expense ratio is negatively related to 
alpha. This finding reflects the preference of managers to 
keep constant or to reduce the percentage levels of fees 
they charge, targeting new money in their funds. 
Furthermore, we record that expense ratio does not relate 
significantly with systematic risk as other variables in the 
regression, such as sales fees, may behave as a proxy for 
the systematic risk. This is likely the case as the 
redemption fee positively affects the expense ratio.  
Finally, we explore the factors that influence fund flows. 
We show that flows and expenses are negatively related. 
This finding is expected since investors are cost-averse. 
This aversion becomes greater when the excess expenses 
are not accompanied with accommodative returns. 
Additionally, we find that funds‟ performance has a 
positive impact on fund flows. When a fund is a winner, 
investors move to invest in it. Finally, we find that the age 
of funds and the size of families‟ assets boost flows to the 
funds. 
Overall, our empirical results suggest that performance, 
expenses and fund flows in the Greek mutual fund market 
can be explained with the same variables used in studies 
for the developed counterparts in the US, Europe and 
elsewhere. This further supports the existing literature on 
market performance and managerial behavior with a 
different set of data in a market with different operating 
characteristics. For example, we do find strong economies 
of scale for expenses, a negative relationship between 
performance and expense ratio, greater expenses in mutual 
funds with greater sales expenses, expense reduction with 
increased performance, funds flow reduction with 
increases in expenses, funds flow increase with the fund 
age and fund family assets size and that a significant 
portion of funds flows remains unexplained. Our analysis 
has also shown that the Greek mutual fund market suffers 
from inadequate competition evidenced from the large 
entry and exit fees, the large expense ratio of two to three 
times that in the developed markets, and the fact that funds 
with already large entry and exit fees charge large expense 
ratios. The lack of adequate competition is also seen in the 
negative relationship between performance and expense 
ratio that is much more that one-for-one seen in developed 
markets. Another finding akin to the Greek market is that, 
fund managers lack sufficient selection ability so that they 
end up with inferior returns relative to the market. The 
above differences found in the Greek mutual fund market 
relative to the developed mutual fund market arise as a 
possible explanation for the decline and current stagnation 
observed in the growth of the former. At a time when the 
investment environment has been changed significantly for 
Greek investors (use of euro as a common currency in the 
Eurozone, need for diversification beyond local assets, free 
movement of capital, low interest rates, easy access to 
outside investment products with lower costs), their 
rational response was to reduce their money flows into 
mutual funds and reduce their holdings in expensive Greek 
mutual funds as evidenced in our study.  Without making 
the needed changes in costs reductions, product 
innovation, and the introduction of ETFs, the Greek 
mutual fund market, being unable to protect investors‟ 
holdings from the stock market fallout in the period 1999-
2002 and without the regular money infusion from pension 
funds, it lost contact with investment developments. 
Despite operating as an oligopoly, this was not a sufficient 
condition for the Greek mutual fund market to thrive in an 
open system whereby investors are allowed to freely 
transact in other markets without currency risk (Eurozone), 
with diversification choices, innovative products and, most 
importantly, at lower costs. The current state of the Greek 
market presents a paradigm for other young and 
developing capital markets that should avoid. The mutual 
fund industry needs an appropriate level of regulation that, 
on the one hand, protects the interests of shareholders and, 
on the other hand, allows for sufficient flexibility and 
innovation to keep up with changes in the investment 
environment and preserve a healthy level of competition. 
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ANNEXURE 
Table 1: The Evolution of Greek Mutual Funds 
This table describes the evolution of the Greek mutual funds market during the period 1988-2006. The table presents data on Greek 
equity, balanced, bond and money market mutual funds excluding funds of funds and mutual funds domiciled abroad. Data concern 
the number of total funds available each year, the number of mutual fund families, the total assets at the end of each year and the 
annual percentage growth of assets. Growth is estimated by subtracting assets on year end t-1 from the assets on yearend t and 
dividing to assets on yearend t-1. For comparison purposes, asset values denominated in drachmas prior to the introduction of euro in 
2002 were translated into euros using the official exchange rate of 340.75 drachmas per one euro. 
End of Year Number of Funds Number of Families Assets (€) Annual Growth  
31/12/1989 3 3 7,691,732.22 - 
31/12/1990 7 6 390,633,754.15 4978.62% 
31/12/1991 18 9 489,823,952.68 25.39% 
31/12/1992 42 16 646,440,970.49 31.97% 
31/12/1993 68 18 2,464,624,242.06 281.26% 
31/12/1994 94 18 3,463,592,863.39 40.53% 
31/12/1995 118 20 6,403,688,905.15 84.89% 
31/12/1996 150 22 9,760,622,407.27 52.42% 
31/12/1997 160 23 20,910,216,131.58 114.23% 
31/12/1998 178 24 26,242,807,262.56 25.50% 
31/12/1999 205 24 34,531,300,802.99 31.58% 
31/12/2000 265 26 30,888,661,998.88 -10.55% 
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31/12/2001 269 26 26,794,904,579.82 -13.25% 
31/12/2002 260 28 25,385,150,553.61 -5.26% 
31/12/2003 265 28 30,398,910,895.26 19.75% 
31/12/2004 261 27 31,645,885,619.98 4.10% 
31/12/2005 247 25 27,134,574,431.95 -14.26% 
31/12/2006 247 25 20,955,010,202.95 -22.77% 
Average 150.47 19.47 15,712,340,526.61 309.04% 
Median 160.00 23.00 20,910,216,131.58 25.45% 
St. Deviat. 103.20 8.47 13,333,858,139.37 1,167.70% 
Min 2.00 2.00 7,691,732.22 -61.40% 
Max 269.00 28.00 34,531,300,802.99 4,978.62% 
Source: Association of Greek Institutional Investors 
 
Table 2:  The descriptive statistics of Greek equity mutual funds 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the principal characteristics of Greek equity mutual funds during the period 2002-
2005. Specifically, the table records the percentage annual gross return of the sample, the expense ratio, (estimated as the asset-
weighted percentage of the annual operating and administrative expenses), the share purchase and redemption percentage fees, the 
size of the average assets under management at yearend, the money flows within the year and the age of mutual funds in number of 
years. Finally, observations reflect the number of the available funds in each year of the studying period.   
 Gross 
Return 
(%) 
Expense 
Ratio (%) 
Purch. 
Fee 
(%) 
Redem. 
Fee 
(%) 
Assets 
(000 €) 
Fund 
Flows  
(000 €) 
Age 
Panel A: 2002, number of observations= 116  
Mean -26.73 4.95 2.91 1.24 31,338.65 9,319.99 4.76 
Median -27.29 4.51 3.00 1.00 6,367.48 14.33 3.15 
St. Deviation 8.76 2.09 1.82 0.64 69,167.36 65,148.73 3.89 
Min -55.66 1.86 0.00 0.00 463.10 -22,751.02 1.08 
Max 5.57 14.66 5.09 3.06 378,945.29 581,960.78 29.84 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Panel B: 2003, number of observations= 112 
Mean 19.38 3.55 2.93 1.42 40,747.38 1,436.80 5.59 
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Median 20.28 3.13 3.02 1.00 9,869.23 145.49 4.05 
St. Deviation 11.35 1.35 1.78 1.05 87,454.80 9,080.03 4.03 
Min -5.33 1.49 0.00 0.00 637.34 -16,657.24 1.00 
Max 49.60 9.14 5.34 5.01 474,273.86 84,325.68 30.84 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Panel C: 2004, number of observations= 114 
Mean 7.42 4.35 2.76 1.45 44,844.71 -2,786.80 6.33 
Median 5.75 3.72 3.00 1.00 9,790.54 -736.51 4.93 
St. Deviation 10.26 2.13 1.89 1.04 93,410.88 18,682.86 4.18 
Min -18.03 1.18 0.00 0.00 578.81 -66,596.26 1.04 
Max 37.30 12.59 5.12 5.08 531,643.87 117,616.64 31.84 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Panel D: 2005, number of observations= 102 
Mean 25.96 3.41 2.37 1.47 58,207.75 -2,436.86 7.46 
Median 27.33 3.03 2.37 1.00 15,719.87 -773.96 5.98 
St. Deviation 9.79 1.29 1.91 0.97 115,302.95 21,811.10 4.41 
Min 0.93 1.01 0.00 0.00 1,000.66 -96,994.82 1.15 
Max 59.95 9.48 5.00 5.00 575,165.28 130,654.07 32.84 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
Table 3. The risk-adjusted performance of Greek equity mutual funds 
This table presents the estimations of Jensen‟s risk-adjusted return for Greek equity mutual funds expressed by the alpha coefficient 
(αi) from the following regression: Ri - Rf  = αi + βi(Rm- Rf) + εi.            (1) 
Ri denotes the return of fund i, Rm represents the return of the average market‟s portfolio and Rf is the risk-free rate. We use the 
weekly return of the Athens Stock Exchange General Index in each year for the period 2002-2005 as the market portfolio and the 
rate of one-week‟s Euribor interest rate as the risk-free rate. We estimate the above model using weekly data. We also estimate the 
above model using monthly return data covering the same period. The beta coefficient (βi) measures the systematic risk of the 
investment in Greek equity mutual funds and the magnitude of the average R-square indicates the adequacy of the performed 
regression. This table also exhibits the number of significant and non-significant positive as well as negative estimations for the 
Jensen‟s alpha at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of acceptance. Finally, the last entry in this table reports the number of the available 
funds in each year of the studying period. 
 Weekly Data Monthly Data 
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Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002-2005 
Average alpha (αi) -0.19 -0.07 -0.23 -0.01 -0.06 
Average beta (βi) 0.71 0.66 0.59 0.61 0.69 
Average R-square 0.64 0.66 0.55 0.59 0.70 
Positive & Significant 
alphas 
1 
(0.86%) 
10 
(8.93%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(1.96%) 
11 
(12.50%) 
Positive & Non- 
Significant alphas 
19 
(16.38%) 
28 
(25.00%) 
8 
(7.02%) 
45 
(44.12%) 
30 
(34.09%) 
Negative & Significant 
alphas 
32 
(27.59%) 
14 
(12.50%) 
61 
(53.51%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
9 
(10.23%) 
Negative & Non- 
Significant alphas 
64 
(55.17%) 
60 
(53.57%) 
45 
(39.47%) 
55 
(53.92%) 
38 
(43.18%) 
Observations (Number of 
Funds)
 116 112 114 102 88 
 
Table 4: The determination of Greek equity mutual funds’ performance 
This table presents the estimations of a cross-sectional regression, which seeks to exploit the factors that affect the performance of 
Greek equity mutual funds in each year during the period 2002-2005. The regressed model is expressed by the following equation:  
R = a0 + a1(ExpRatio.) + a2(PurFee) + a3(RedFee) + a4(LnAge) + a5(Dummy) + ε        (2) 
R is the dependent variable computed as the yearly total gross return of equity funds in each year. The control variables are the 
expense ratio (ExpRatio), which is estimated as the asset-weighted percentage of the annual operating and administrative expenses, 
the purchase (PurFee) and redemption (RedFee) fees, the age of the fund (LnAge), which expresses the natural logarithm of age, 
and a dummy variable (Dummy) which takes the value of 1 if the fund is a subsidiary of a bank and the value of 0, otherwise. We 
use the natural logarithm of age due to the non-linear relationship between the performance and the age of funds. t-statistics are in 
parentheses and R-square indicates the adequacy of the performed regression. Observations reflect the number of the available 
funds in each year. 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Constant -27.42 
(-9.23)* 
31.19 
(7.99)* 
6.23 
(1.64) 
38.77 
(7.53)* 
Expense Ratio -0.05 
(-0.24) 
-2.47 
(-4.00)* 
-1.41 
(-3.08)* 
-1.87 
(-2.55)** 
Purchase Fee 0.61 
(2.16)** 
-1.71 
(-3.03)* 
0.42 
(0.69) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Redemption Fee -1.56 
(-2.22)** 
3.28 
(3.32)* 
0.58 
(0.53) 
0.53 
(0.45) 
LnAge -0.90 -1.21 3.60 -3.27 
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(-1.23) (-0.83) (2.39)** (-1.71)*** 
Dummy 1.78 
(1.63) 
-2.22 
(-1.08) 
-0.88 
(-0.37) 
-2.29 
(-1.02) 
R-square 0.59 0.37 0.16 0.29 
F-statistic 26.42* 10.38* 4.02* 5.48* 
Observations (Funds)
 
116 112 114 102 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of acceptance, respectively. 
Table 5: The determination of Greek equity mutual funds’ expense ratio 
This table presents the estimations of a cross-sectional regression, which seeks to exploit the factors that affect the expense ratio of 
Greek equity mutual funds in each year during the period 2002-2005. The regression model is expressed by the following equation:  
ExpRatio = a0 + a1(LnAssets) + a2(Alpha) + a3(Beta) + a4(PurFee) + a5(RedFee) + ε.      (3) 
ExpRatio is the dependent variable estimated as the asset-weighted percentage of the annual operating and administrative expenses. 
The explanatory variables are the natural logarithm of the assets under management (LnAssets), the risk-adjusted return (Alpha), 
the systematic risk (Beta), and the percentage fees of purchase (PurFee) or redeeming (RedFee) shares of mutual funds. We use the 
natural logarithm of assets due to the possible non-linear relationship between expense ratio and assets. t-statistics are in 
parentheses and R-square indicates the adequacy of the performed regression. Observations reflect the number of the available 
funds in each year. 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Constant 13.21 
(7.75)* 
7.56 
(5.84)* 
13.81 
(5.35)* 
9.11 
(6.11)* 
LnAssets -0.54 
(-4.24)* 
-0.28 
(-3.64)* 
-0.66 
(-4.76)* 
-0.37 
(-4.40)* 
Alpha 0.35 
(0.31) 
-0.98 
(-1.39) 
-1.57 
(-1.69)*** 
-1.87 
(-1.87)*** 
Beta 0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(-0.22) 
0.96 
(1.14) 
-0.18 
(-0.41) 
Purchase Fee 0.15 
(1.51) 
0.06 
(0.82) 
-0.13 
(-1.44) 
-0.12 
(-1.89)*** 
Redemption Fee -0.17 
(-0.62) 
0.26 
(2.14)** 
0.46 
(2.18)** 
0.51 
(3.10)* 
R-square 0.22 0.24 0.34 0.40 
F-statistic 6.08* 6.72* 10.99* 12.83* 
Observations (Funds)
 
116 112 114 102 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of acceptance respectively. 
 
Table 6: The determination of Greek equity mutual funds’ flows 
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This table presents the estimations of a cross-sectional regression, which seeks to exploit the factors that affect the net money flows 
towards Greek equity mutual funds in each year during the period 2002-2005. The regressed model is expressed by the following 
equation: LnFlows = a0 + a1(ExpRatio) + a2(LnAge) + a3(Alpha) + a4(LnFamily) + ε.           (4) 
LnFlows is the dependent variable estimated as the natural logarithm of the absolute difference between the money inflows and 
outflows from the fund at the end of each calendar year. The explanatory variables are the expense ratio (ExpRatio), estimated as 
the asset-weighted percentage of the annual operating and administrative expenses, the risk-adjusted performance (Alpha), the 
natural logarithm of the mutual funds‟ age (LnAge), and the natural logarithm of the funds‟ family (LnFamily) total assets under 
management. We use the natural logarithms due to the possible non- linear relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. t-statistics are in parentheses and R-square indicates the adequacy of the performed regression. Observations reflect the 
number of the available funds in each year of the studying period.  
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Constant 7.95 
(3.61)* 
11.14 
(6.03)* 
9.00 
(4.40)* 
5.95 
(2.99)* 
Expense Ratio -0.23 
(-2.49)** 
-0.48 
(-3.99)* 
-0.13 
(-1.67)*** 
-0.25 
(-1.90)*** 
LnAge 1.38 
(5.07)* 
0.51 
(2.01)** 
0.56 
(1.78)*** 
0.88 
(3.16)* 
Alpha 1.05 
(1.33) 
1.79 
(2.14)** 
0.80 
(0.89) 
2.01 
(1.50) 
LnFamily 0.26 
(2.52)** 
0.18 
(2.04)** 
0.26 
(2.78)* 
0.39 
(4.54)* 
R-square 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.34 
F-statistic 13.23* 10.33* 5.04* 12.49* 
Observations (Funds)
 
116 112 114 102 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of acceptance, respectively. 
 
